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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Section
78-2-2,

and

by

and

constitutional powers.

through

its

inherent

equitable

and

Plaintiff in a District Court may take an

appeal to this Court from a Final Judgment or Order.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
POINT I. WHEN CONSIDERING THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, WAS IT A MISTAKE, ERROR IN LAW, OR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO DISREGARD, DISCARD, DISALLOW, AND PUT ASIDE
ESTABLISHED EXISTING PRINCIPLES OF UTAH CASE LAW WHICH PROVIDES
THAT CREDIBILITY OR THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE IS NOT CONSIDERED ON A
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT?
Standard of Review:
Where the district court may
exercise broad discretion, we presume the correctness of
the Court's decision absent manifest injustice or
inequity that indicates a clear abuse of discretion.
Crockett v. Crockett, 193 UAR at 17.
The trial court "does not have the authority to ignore
existing principles of law in favor of its view of the equities,
R.L. Warner v. Sirstins, 195 UAR AT 6.
POINT II. SHOULD THE APPELLATE COURT AWARD AND ENTER JUDGMENT FOR
PLAINTIFF IN THE AMOUNT OF $99,000.00, PLUS LEGAL INTEREST THEREON,
FROM JUNE 9, 1990 TO DATE BECAUSE OF THE BREACH OF CONTRACT BY
DEFENDANT?

Standard of Review: "However, a remand is not necessary
if the evidence in the record is undisputed and the
appellate court can fairly and properly resolve the case
on the record before it." Flying Diamond Oil Corp, v.
Newton Sheep Co., 109 UAR at 13. "Interpretation of an
'unambiguous, integrated contract is a question of law,
which is reviewed on appeal for correctness.' (Case
cited) *** A cardinal rule in construing a contract is to
give effect to the intentions of the parties and, if
possible, to glean those intentions 'from an examination
of the text of the contract itself. ' (Case cited) It is
a long-standing rule in Utah that persons dealing at
arm's length are entitled to contract on their own terms
without the intervention of the courts to relieve either
party from the effects of a bad bargain." (Case cited).
A.
The Appellate Court should reverse the final judgment
awarded to defendant and remand for determination the plaintiff's
causes of actions of (1) mental anguish and distress, (2)
negligence and reckless indifference, (3) conversion and (4)
constructive fraud.
Standard of Review: See Crockett supra. We reverse only
if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prevailing party we conclude that the evidence is
insufficient to support the verdict. Crookston v. Fire
Ins. Exch. 817 P.2d 789.
POINT III. ARE THE FINDINGS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, A MISTAKE, OR
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS WHEN BASED ON SUSPICION, SPECULATION, CONJECTURE,
GUESSES OR SURMISE?
Standard of Review: In construing Rule 52(a), we do not
set aside the Trial Court's factual findings unless they
are against the clear weight of the evidence or we
otherwise reach a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made. Western Kane County etc. v.
Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376.
Factual findings are clearly erroneous if they are without
adequate evidentiary support or induced by an erroneous view of the
law. Western Cap.S Sec, v. Knudsvicr 768 P2d. 989 cert.den.; R.L.
Warner v.Sirstins, 195 UAR at 5, supra.
A. The Conclusions and Judgment cannot be correct when the
Findings are based on suspicion, speculation, conjecture, guesses
or surmise.
Standard of Review: On review, we accord conclusions of
law no particular deference, but review them for
correctness *** we are free to reappraise the Trial
Court's legal conclusions. Western Fiberglass v. Kirton,
2

McConkie and Bushnell, 129 UAR at 29. Copper State T&L
v. Bruno, 735 P.2d at 389. We accord no deference to the
Trial Court's Conclusions that the facts are not in
dispute. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 188 UAR at 32.
B. The Trial Court erred and abused its discretion in denying
plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial.
Standard of Review: A trial court's grant or denial of
a motion for a new trial will not be overturned on appeal
absent an abuse of discretion, (cases cited).
The
general rule concerning abuse of discretion is that the
appellate court "will presume that the discretion of the
trial court was properly exercised unless the record
clearly shows to the contrary." (cases cited). Matter of
Estate of Justheim. (CA 1991) 824 P.2d at 433, 175 UAR
38.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND PROVISIONS
The pertinent parts of the following Rules and Statutes are
provided in Addendum -*-1 .
U.R.C.P. Rule 56(a) (c)(d) and (e) , also cited at (R.66; 406);
Utah Code Ann. Section 21-5-4, also cited at (R.945);
U.C.A. Section 21-5-8, also cited at (R.944).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
a.

Nature of the Case
Plaintiff was and is a Canadian citizen, resident, and

businessman.

Defendant sells travelerfs cheques worldwide. (See

Plf "s Exhibits 10-P and 11-P). Plaintiff and defendant, in Canada,
entered into a Purchase Agreement, Addendum

6 , (R.18 and 57) . In

May 1990, plaintiff purchased from defendant $99,000.00 worth of
U.S. traveler's cheques (R.41-43; 410).

(Also see Plaintiff's

Exhibit 09.) Plaintiff reported to defendant (Plf's Exhibit 5 and
6) and the Police ( Plf's Exhibit 4) on June 8-9, 1990 that the
$99,000.00 worth of cheques were lost or stolen (R.51-53; 409).
3

Plaintiff made demand for a refund or replacement of cheques
pursuant to the Purchase Agreement.

Defendant refused (R.54).

Plaintiff brought this suit against defendant alleging as causes of
actions (1) a breach of contract, (2) mental anguish and distress,
(3) negligence and reckless indifference, (4) conversion, and (5)
constructive fraud

(R.2-25).

Defendant admitted the Purchase

Agreement, Addendum _J>, and the purchase by plaintiff of $99,000.00
worth of the traveler's cheques (R.29-31) (R.656-657), denied the
cheques were lost or stolen, denied that plaintiff was entitled to
a judgment.

Defendant questioned plaintiff's credibility (R.75).

Please see Pretrial Order (R.653-662):

Plaintiff purchased

202 American Express Traveler's Cheques (R.656-657).

178 cheques,

valued at $87,000.00, were cashed. 178 cheques were turned over to
Toronto Police Forensic for examination R.658 & (R.361).

Toronto

Police Officer Technician Myers examined the 178 cheques and found
Paul Pauze's thumbprints on 12 cheques (R.658); also see R.361.
Detective Baxter, a Toronto Police Officer, and defendant's
Canadian Security Manager Bruce Barr, testified they have no idea
where the other $12,000.00 worth of traveler's cheques are (R.1548;
1217).

Nicholls testified he lost his cheques

(R.400).

The

Canadian Police and defendant have had no evidence at any time that
plaintiff

cashed,

negotiated,

or

countersigned

the

cheques,

Addendums _8, _9, and 10 (R.411-412; 1218; 1551). The Police have
had no evidence at any time of conspiracy (R.1551), Addendum
b.

Course of Proceedings

4

10.

1.

Plaintiff

filed

his

First

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment for breach of contract for $99,000.00, according to Rule
56 (R.66), with a supporting Affidavit by plaintiff based upon
personal knowledge (R.39-57) and Memorandum (R.58-63).

Defendant

opposed the Motion claiming plaintiff's questionable credibility,
see Memorandum R.70, and filed Affidavits by Attorney Mark Webber
(R.83) and Bruce Barr (R.109) and Police Technician Myers (R.360).
The Webber

and Barr Affidavits are not based upon personal

knowledge.

Plaintiff's Affidavit shows that there is no genuine

issue of any material fact and plaintiff is entitled to judgment as
a

matter

of

law

(R.39-57).

Defendant's Memorandum

alleges

"Nicholls' questionable credibility" as the issue (R.75).

The

Myers1 Affidavit states that 12 thumbprints on the cheques are
identified as Paul Pauze's (R.360).
The Trial Court, on March 9, 1992, entered its Ruling, among
other things, stating, "I have heard the arguments Mr. Anderson has
made and with regard to the cases that he has brought to the
Court's attention, the Court cannot weigh the testimony that is
presented to it in the context of summary judgment.
the

credibility

Nevertheless,

the

of

one

witness

defendant

or

a

as

against

non-moving

Can't weigh

another.
party

can

***
put

credibility of a witness at issue, and that is certainly what is at
the heart of this particular case" *** Addendum

3 , (R.1167-68),

and entered an Order denying the Motion (R.368).
2.

After further discovery by both parties, plaintiff

filed a Second Motion for Summary Judgment according to Rule 56
5

(R.390-401), with supporting documents and Memorandum (R.402-408),
showing that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Defendant opposed the Motion, filed documents and Memorandum
alleging whether Nicholls complied with the Purchase Agreement,
whether Nicholls transferred the cheques to anyone else, whether
Nicholls

conspired

in

cashing

the

cheques,

and

Nicholls1

credibility as the issues (R.429-432).
On June 23, 1992, the Trial Court entered its Ruling *** "It
appears to me that credibility is a major issue in this particular
case and I think that therefore the cases that say that credibility
should not be weighed really are not applicable to this particular
matter. I think there is a genuine issue of fact as to credibility
in this case for the reasons stated by Mr. Roche." *** Addendum _4
(R.1165-66); and entered an Order denying the Motion (R.674). The
case was set for trial.
c.

Disposition at Trial Court
The case was tried without a jury on July 7-8, 1992

(R.1192-1369, 1370-1576, 1577-1626). The Court entered its Ruling
dated July 14, 1992 (R.1577-1626) among other things stating at
R.1615, "This case, in my judgment, does turn on the credibility of
Mr. Nicholls, the plaintiff, and the following are the Court's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law." *** and at R.1622, "I
believe that there is a very strong suspicion of conspiracy between
Mr. Nicholls and Mr. Pauze, and perhaps even Mr. Jones, and maybe

6

even his brother, and those are the others I believe the plaintiff
is entitled to look to in support of their theory." Addendum
1.

Based on the Ruling, Findings and Conclusions were

entered (R.1033-37), Addendum
2.

5 .

1 .

Finding 3(j) provides "In light of the foregoing and

all the other evidence adduced at trial, there is a very strong
suspicion of conspiracy among Nicholls, Pauze, and perhaps even Mr.
Len Jones and Mr. Brad Nicholls." (R.1036).
3.

Based on the Findings and Conclusions, the Judgment

was entered (R.1039), Addendum
4.

Plaintiff

2 .

filed

and

served

Objections

Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment (R.986; 1048).

to

the

Plaintiff also

moved the Court to amend, vacate, and set them aside (R.1048).
5.

Plaintiff filed and served a Motion for New Trial,

Motion to Set Aside Judgment, and Motion for Judgment for Plaintiff
(R.1058). Plaintiff moved to deny costs to defendant, and objected
to the Motion to Tax Costs Against Plaintiff

(R.943).

The

Objections were overruled and the Motions denied on the 25th day of
September 1992 (R.1153). The final Judgment is dated September 21,
1992 (R.1040), Addendum

2 .

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A*

Plaintiff, a Canadian citizen and resident, entered into

the Purchase Agreement, Addendum

6 . with defendant in Canada in

May 1990 whereby plaintiff purchased $99,000.00 worth of U.S.
traveler's cheques (R41-43; 410). Plaintiff reported to defendant
and the Police on June 8-9, 1990 that the cheques were lost or
7

stolen

(R 51-53;409).

Plaintiff made demand for a refund or

replacement of cheques for $99,000.00 (R.54). Defendant refused to
refund or replace the $99,000.00. Defendant's Claims Office is in
Salt Lake County. Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant in
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County alleging breach of
contract, mental anguish and distress, negligence and reckless
indifference,

conversion,

and

constructive

fraud

(R.2-25).

Defendant generally denied the allegations. See Defendant's Answer
(R.28-38).
B.

Plaintiff filed a First and Second Motion for Summary

Judgment for breach of contract (R.66 & 390), which Motions were
denied.
C.

See Addendum

3

and

4 Rulings.

The case went to a bench trial. Findings and Conclusions

were entered, Addendum

1 , with Judgment awarded and entered for

defendant (R.1040), Addendum

2 .

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

The First and Second Motions for Summary Judgment should

have been granted on the grounds and reasons that there was no
genuine issue of any material fact, as to the breach of contract by
defendant, and that plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment as
a matter of law in the amount of $99,000.00 plus interest according
to U.R.C.P. Rule 56. The defendant's whole case at all times was
based on disbelief of plaintifffs credibility. The Court in Ruling
on the Motions at the hearings provided that defendant could allege
credibility as the issue.

The Court, upon hearing the motions,

considered and ruled that plaintiff's credibility was an issue,
8

Addendums

3

and

4 ; and denied the Motions.

The denials wer#

mistakes, abuses, and clearly erroneous.
2.

The trial court disregarded, discarded, disallowed and

put aside (Rulings R.1165-66-67-68) Addendums

3

and

4 ) the

established and existing principles of Utah Case Law which provides
that it is not the purpose of the Summary Judgment procedure to
judge the credibility of the averments of parties, or witnesses, or
the weight of the evidence, Holbrook v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, and
this line of cases dating back to about 1958 (R.61; 405-406).
The purpose and effectiveness of good law and order, in
complying

with

established

and

existing

Utah

Case

Law,

is

substantially impaired or destroyed if the trial court can judge
credibility or the weight of evidence as the issue at a breach of
contract Motion for Summary Judgment.
PRIME EXAMPLE;

If a person on probation or a parolee or a

person with a criminal record signs an unambiguous contract and
then tries to enforce the contract in court, the other party could
raise credibility as an issue and try to bash the person and bash
the contract and defeat the terms and conditions of the contract by
alleging an issue of credibility on a summary judgment motion.
3.

The trial court "does not have the authority to ignore

existing principles of law in favor of its view of the equities."
R.L. Warner v. Sirstins, 195 UAR at 6.

Equity follows the law,

Scoqqins v. State Const., 485 P.2d 391. "The Court cannot consider
the weight of testimony

or the credibility

considering a motion for summary judgment"
9

of witnesses
(R.406).

in

»*** A

judgment may not rest on conjecture and speculation or on mere
surmise or suspicion nor may a judgment find support in assumptions
or in possibilities or probabilities falling short of actual
proof." 49 C.J.S. JUDGMENTS. Section 44. Pl04.

"The rule is well

established that a factfinder cannot disregard uncontroverted and
unimpeached testimony or the only evidence upon a material question
in controversy and return a verdict in direct opposition." Briscoe
v. Ehrlich, 674 P.2d 1064.
4.

Neither does the trial court have authority to convert a

Motion for Summary Judgment (a law matter - breach of contract)
into some fact matter - judging an issue to be plaintiff's
credibility.
5.

Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991).

This court is requested to reverse the judgment awarded

to defendant, and enter judgment for plaintiff on the breach of
contract for $99,000.00 plus legal interest thereon from June 9,
1990 until paid; and remand for determination plaintiff's other
causes

of

action,

mental

anguish,

negligence

indifference, constructive fraud and conversion.

and

reckless

(See Plf's

Exhibits 10-P and 11-P, Defendant's financial ability to pay.)
Standard of Review:
"However, a remand is not
necessary if the evidence in the record is undisputed and
the appellate court can fairly and properly resolve the
case on the record before it." Flying Diamond Oil Corp.
v. Newton Sheep Co., 109 UAR at 13. "Interpretation of
an 'unambiguous, integrated contract is a question of
law, which is reviewed on appeal for correctness.' (Case
cited) *** A cardinal rule in construing a contract is to
give effect to the intentions of the parties and, if
possible, to glean those intentions' from an examination
of the text of the contract itself. ' (Case cited) It is
a long-standing rule in Utah that persons dealing at
arm's length are entitled to contract on their own terms
10

without the intervention of the courts to relieve either
party from the effects of a bad bargain.111 (Case cited)
6.

The Finding 3(j) states, In light of the foregoing and

all the other evidence adduced at trial, there is a very strong
suspicion of conspiracy among Nicholls, Pauze and perhaps even Mr.
Len Jones and Mr. Brad Nicholls, Addendum

1 , (R.1036).

Finding is no basis for the Conclusions and Judgment.

This

"When the

evidence offered to prove a vital fact is so weak as to do no more
than create a mere surmise or suspicion of its existence, the
evidence is no more than a scintilla and, in legal effect, is no
evidence" (Corpus Christi, R.1070).
From Corpus Christi v. Heldenfels Bros., 802 S.W.2d at p 39,
When the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is so weak as
to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of its
existence, the evidence is no more than a scintilla and, in
legal effect, is no evidence. (Cases cited). We hold that
the unsubstantiated conclusions and speculations of these
Heldenfels employees provides no evidence that the City had
notice of Heldenfels's expectation to be paid by it before
delivery of the T-beams.
It is manifest and substantial injustice and a mistake to use
Finding

3(j) to support the Conclusions and Judgment.

Conclusions

and

Judgment

"cannot

be

based

on

guesses,

The
or

conjectures" (Oldenburg, R.1072) and "disbelief does not create
affirmative evidence to the contrary of that which is discarded."
Finding 3(j) is not even a scintilla of evidence to support the
Conclusions and Judgment. The Findings, R.1033, Addendum

1 , are

not pertinent to plaintiff's claims of mental anguish and distress,
negligence and reckless indifference, and constructive fraud.

11

From Oldenburg v. Sears Roebuck & Co,, 314 P.2d at 36:
As pointed out in Reese v. Smith, 70 P.2d at page 935:
if the existence of an essential fact upon which a party
relies is left in doubt or uncertainty, the party upon
whom the burden rests to establish that fact should
suffer, and not his adversary. (Citation) A judgment
cannot be based on guesses or conjectures. (Citation)
Nor may a verdict be upheld "only by resort to
speculation". Gray v. Carter, 224 P. 2d 28, 30.
Substantial evidence is required to establish each
essential affirmative allegation - a scintilla of
evidence is not sufficient for that purpose.
In re
Estate of Teed, 247 P.2d 54. Of course an inference is
sufficient to establish a fact in issue but such an
inference must be founded on "a fact legally proved." In
analyzing the testimony to determine whether there is
sufficient evidence to support a particular finding, an
"appellate court must accept as established all facts and
all inferences favorable to respondent which find
substantial support in the evidence." New v. New. 306
P.2d 987, 994. It is, of course, the province of the
jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses.
Naturally, in the exercise of their discretion, they may
reject testimony as unworthy of credence, but "disbelief
does not create affirmative evidence to the contrary of
that which is discarded". Lubin v. Lubin, 302 P.2d 49,
60; In re Estate of Bould. 289 P.2d 15. The fact that a
jury may disbelieve the testimony of a witness who
testifies to the negative of an issue does not of itself
furnish any evidence in support of the affirmative of
that issue, and does not warrant a finding in the
affirmative thereof unless there is other evidence in the
case to support such affirmative (R.1072).
ARGUMENT
POINT I, WHEN CONSIDERING THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, WAS IT A MISTAKE, ERROR IN LAW, OR AN
ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO DISREGARD,
DISCARD, DISALLOW, AND PUT ASIDE ESTABLISHED EXISTING
PRINCIPLES OF UTAH CASE LAW WHICH PROVIDES THAT
CREDIBILITY OR THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE IS NOT CONSIDERED
ON A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT?
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF GRANTING THE FIRST MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
(R.40-49):

Plaintiff's Affidavit is based upon personal knowledge
Plaintiff purchased $99,000.00 worth of traveler's
12

cheques as of May 30, 1990 (R.43); Before loss (R.57) he signed the
traveler's cheques in the upper left hand corner in permanent ink.
He did not sign the traveler's cheques in the lower left corner
(R.47), he did not give the traveler's cheques to another person or
company to hold or to keep or as part of a confidence game (R.48),
he did not use the traveler's cheques in violation of any law,
including as part of an illegal bet, game of chance, or other
prohibitive action (R.48), and that the traveler's cheques were not
taken by Court order or by government action (R.48). Plaintiff did
not cash, countersign or negotiate the cheques (R.40-49).
loss

After

(R.57) he immediately notified defendant and the police

(R.45), and reported all facts of the loss of theft and answered
their questions, and gave them serial numbers and completed
defendant's refund forms, and defendant took his picture, and he
did not transfer or deliver the cheques to anyone, and he purchased
the cheques to use as cash and relied on the safety of the cheques.
Defendant failed and refused to deliver to plaintiff cash or
replacement

cheques

in

the

amount

of

$99,000.00

(R.40-49).

Defendant admits the purchase of the $99,000.00 worth of cheques
(R.29-33) and admits the Purchase Agreement, Addendum 6 , (R.33).
See plaintiff's Memorandum (R.58). Summary judgment is proper
if the pleadings, admissions on file and Affidavit show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, URCP 56; Gadd v.
Olson, 685 P.2d 1041, Holbrook v. Webster Inc., 320 P.2d 661
(R.61).
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There being no genuine issue of a material fact, plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment should have been granted by the trial
court against defendant for breach of contract.
[ This Appellate Court should enter judgment for plaintiff
against

defendant

for

breach

of

contract

in the

amount

of

$99,000.00 plus legal interest from June 9, 1990 to date.]
EVIDENCE REGARDING THE DENIAL OF THE FIRST MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT. Defendant relied on "Nicholls' questionable credibility"
(R.75).

The Affidavit of Attorney Mark S. Webber (R.83), which is

not based upon personal knowledge, but based mainly upon hearsay
and conclusions states; that American Express has reason to believe
that some of the statements made in Nicholls' Affidavit are false
(R.85).

That upon information and belief, Nicholls either signed

the traveler's cheques himself or used accomplices to purchase and
to forge the traveler's cheques on his behalf

(R.85).

That

American Express has reason to believe that Nicholls has a criminal
record (R.85).

That American Express needs an additional three

months to complete its investigation, R.86.

That Nicholls was

fined $200.00 in 1988 (R.106).
The Affidavit of Bruce Barr (R.109), which is not based upon
personal knowledge, but based mainly upon hearsay and conclusions
states; that he is the defendant's Security Manager for Ontario
(R.109).

He made some telephone calls (R.110), and that Nicholls

had reported missing his Visa card (R.lll), and that Barr called
the Police at the Airport and confirmed that someone by the name of
Nicholls had flown to Sweden on June 3, 1990 (R.lll), and Barr
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spoke

to

Virginia

Cartwright

on

the

telephone

(who

is

in

defendant's Salt Lake City Office) (R.lll), and that Nicholls and
his Attorney Bob Fenn attended a meeting at defendant's office, and
that after Barr's

initial contact with Nicholls

suspicious of this claim" (R.lll).

"I am very

That Barr made "inquiries

through the security offices of local banks" and heard some
information and met with some people regarding suspicious claims of
Nicholls, and Barr formerly laid a complaint of fraud regarding the
loss of these cheques (R.112).
to

the Attorney

General

Barr requested the cheques be sent

Forensic

Laboratory

analysis as well as being fingerprinted (R.113).

for handwriting
Barr called the

Insurance Crime Prevention Bureau and was supplied information
regarding insurance claims by Nicholls since 1983, and that the
insurance claims were all paid to Nicholls (R.113).

That on an

occasion Nicholls declined a request to take a polygraph test
(R.114).
Defendant submitted the Supplemental Affidavit of Bruce Barr
dated February 28, 1992 (R.353):

Subsequent to lodging a criminal

complaint against Nicholls with the Metropolitan Toronto Police
Force, Barr had numerous conversations and meetings with Detective
Baxter (R.354). That Baxter informed me that fingerprints of Pauze
had been found on several traveler's cheques.

That none of the

prints on the cheques were those of Nicholls (R.354).

That some

fingerprints on the cheques had been identified as those of Paul
Pauze, an associate of Nicholls. That Baxter had a photograph of
Pauze and would be interviewing tellers who had cashed some cheques
15

(R.354). That Baxter had positive identification of Paul Pauze "as
being the person who cashed the stolen traveler's cheques11 ***
(R.354).

That Detective Baxter charged and arrested Pauze on one

count of fraud, one count of possession of property obtained by
crime, and eight counts of uttering a forged document contrary to
the criminal code of Canada (R.356) . That at the completion of the
Pauze Preliminary Hearing held

in Provincial Court, Ontario,

February 3, 1992, all charges against Pauze were either dismissed
or withdrawn by the Crown Attorney (R.356).

But see Addendum

7 .

Barr stated in the Supplemental Affidavit at R.483-484 that
Baxter informed me that he had positive identification of Paul
Pauze as being the person "who cashed the stolen traveler's
cheques1'*** (R.483).
Defendant submitted portions of Nicholls1 Deposition (R.228352) : That his brother Brad did not work in the Office, he worked
in the shop fixing forklifts (R.247).

That Nicholls had not been

convicted of a felony; that Nicholls purchased $17,000.00 in
cheques on May 8, 1990 (R.241) to purchase Lift Trucks for his
business; that he signed the cheques in the top left-hand corner
(R.251); that the teller was standing there when I signed them
(R.252); that he took the $17,000.00 of cheques to his office and
put them in his unlocked desk (R.252) and he did not tell anyone he
purchased the cheques or put them in his desk (R.253); that he did
not attend the auction in Chicago.

That he purchased $82,000.00

worth of cheques on May 30, 1990 (R.254-261); that he planned to
attend a Lift Truck Auction in Sweden on June 4 and 5, 1990. The
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terms of payments were cash (R.242-263) . That after purchasing the
$82,000.00 in cheques he placed them in his brief case with the
$17,000.00 with his birth certificate, credit cards, drivers
license; he put the brief case in the trunk of his Volkswagen
(R.270-278).

That he was at a car wash (R.281).

That he did not

confirm the cheques were locked in the trunk (R.286-287). He left
the cheques in his brief case in the trunk of his car at home
(R.293).

The next morning it did not appear his car had been

broken into (R.295).

On May 31, he drove his car to work. He did

not check the trunk or the brief case or the cheques (R.309).

He

did not learn about the cheques being lost or stolen until June 8,
1990.

He could not identify a possibility as to when or how the

cheques could have been lost or stolen (R.298).

On June 3, he

packed his suitcase for his trip to Sweden and placed it in the
trunk of his car. He did not confirm the cheques were in the brief
case (R. 313-314).

He traveled to Sweden on June 3 and went to the

auction on June 4 and 5; he took the brief case to the auction but
the bids were too high to purchase any Fork Lifts (R. 317-328) . He
returned on June 6, 1990, and he kept his brief case with him on
the airplane, but never opened it.

When he arrived home he took

the brief case into his house. He did not open it. On June 7, he
went to work but forgot to take his brief case (R.332-337).

On

June 8, 1990, he took the brief case to work, opened the brief
case, and found the cheques were missing and his birth certificate
and drivers license were missing (R.333-334). He notified American
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Express.

He had two identical brief cases and both were used in

his business (R.312-315).
The Affidavit of Gordon W. Myers filed February 28, 1992
(R.360-61) states; that he is a Senior Fingerprint Technician for
the Toronto Police and that he received and examined 178 American
Express Traveler's Cheques valued at a total of $87,000.00, and
that he identified Paul Pauze's thumbprints on 12 cheques.
[ There being no genuine issue of a material fact, the
plaintiff should have been granted a summary judgment against
defendant by the trial court for breach of contract.]
IT IS TO BE NOTED that in the case of Her Majesty the Queen v.
Paul

Pauze, there

were

10 charges

against

Pauze.

At

the

Preliminary Inquiry before Judge E. S. Lindsay, February 3, 1992
(R.2474-2536) the Prosecutor subpoenaed 8 people and called only 2
as witnesses. The Transcript also shows the conversations between
the Prosecutor Ms. Lustman, the Court and Defense Attorney Morris
in which the Court stated, "The accused then is discharged."
(R.2535), Addendum

7.

EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
Plaintiff's Second Motion for Summary Judgment (R.390) for
relief on breach of contract was supported by pages annexed from
the Deposition of defendant's Security Manager, Albert Bruce Barr.
He testified that he and American Express have no evidence that Mr.
Nicholls is involved and his basis is "belief on mv part", and he
has no evidence that Mr.Nicholls cashed, negotiated or signed the
18

bottom left hand corner of the negotiated traveler's cheques
(R. 393-398).

See Addendum 8.

This motion was also based upon

plaintiff's personal knowledge Affidavit dated September 6, 1990
with exhibits annexed thereto (R.39-49) (please see Evidence in
Support of Granting the First Motion for Summary Judgment, supra)
and plaintiff's Deposition, "I told them I had lost my traveler's
cheques." (R.400).
Plaintiff also supported this Second Motion for summary
judgment with a Memorandum (R.405-406) citing the Supreme Court of
Utah existing and established line of cases, "Clearly, it is not
for a court to weigh the evidence or assess credibility *** The
purpose of summary judgment is not to weigh the evidence."

The

mere assertion that an issue of fact exists without a proper
evidentiary foundation to support that assertion is insufficient to
preclude the granting of a summary judgment motion, Webster v.
Sill, (Utah 1983) 675 P.2d 1170, citing Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural
Res. Co. , (Utah) 627 P.2d 56; Walker v. Rocky Mt. Recreation Corp.,
508 P.2d 538; Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723; Holbrook v. Adams,
542 P.2d 191.

"The court cannot consider the weight of testimony

or the credibility of witnesses in considering a motion for summary
judgment." The court "simply determines that there is no disputed
issue of material fact and that as a matter of law a party should
prevail."

Singleton v. Alexander. 431 P.2d at 128; Sandberg v.

Klein, 576 P.2d 1291. "Summary judgment is proper when the record
indicates 'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. '"
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Jones v. Bountiful City. 187 UAR at 23. Summary judgment affirmed
for Bountiful City.

See Rule 56.

Summary judgment is never used

to determine what the facts are, but only to ascertain whether
there are any material issues of fact in dispute, Hill v. Grand
Central. Inc.. 25 Utah 2d at 123 (R.405-406).
Kindly see Addendums 3 and 4 where the trial court abandoned,
discarded, disregarded and disallowed the above cited established
existing line of Utah Case Law principles when hearing the Motions
for Summary Judgment.
The trial court should have granted summary judgment to
plaintiff for $99,000.00 plus legal interest thereon from June 9,
1990 to date because of defendant's breach of contract.
This Court should award judgment to plaintiff for $99,000.00
plus legal interest thereon from June 9, 1990 to date because of
defendant's breach of contract.

See Flying Diamond, supra.

EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Defendant raised the issue of Nicholls' credibility in
opposing the Summary Judgment (R.432) in its Memorandum (R.422).
Defendant filed some pages from the Deposition of Nicholls (R.440477), to wit:

After he purchased $17,000.00 worth of traveler's

cheques, he placed said cheques in his desk drawer and did not tell
anyone he purchased them or put them in the desk drawer (R.441458) . He purchased $82,000.00 worth of cheques on May 30, 1990 and
put said cheques in his brief case with the $17,000.00 worth of
cheques, and put the brief case in the trunk of his car until he
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left for Sweden, that he did not remove the cheques from his brief
case or open it from May 30 until June 8, 1990 when he discovered
the cheques missing (R.465-477).
Nicholls and Paul Pauze have known each other for ten years in
a business relationship and social relationship (R.555). Pauze was
charged with fraud, possession, and uttering forged documents with
regards to some of the traveler's cheques (R.554).
Nicholls testified at Pauze's Preliminary Inquiry (R.554).
He was asked, Q: Have you given anyone permission to have these
cheques?

A:

I have no present recollection of that.

given anyone permission to use the cheques?

Q: Have you

A: I have no present

recollection of that (R.555). Q: When you found that the cheques
were not in your brief case what did you do?
my other brief case.
identical.

A: I went looking for

I have two brief cases.

They were almost

Q: Did you find this other brief case?

A: No, I didn't

(R.555-556). Nicholls called and told American Express that he had
lost or misplaced the traveler's cheques and he called the Police
(R.556). Pause could have touched the cheques in the Office (R573).
The Prosecutor showed Nicholls some cheques that had some
chemicals on them that turns your hands funny color (R.557).
Q:

Are you able to identify that cheque (R.557)?

A:

I t

appears it is an American Express Traveler's Cheque (R.558). Q: Is
that your signature on the upper left side of this cheque?

A: It

appears to be (R.558). Q: I don't suppose you remember the serial
numbers?

A: I have no recollection of that (R.558).
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Nicholls responded that his signature appears to be in the
upper left hand corner of the cheques (R.558-559). The Prosecutor
requested him to look through the cheques once again regarding the
counter-signature on the bottom of the cheques (R.559).
in fact sign those cheques?

A: Where?

Q: Did you

Q: On the bottom left where

it says counter-sign in presence of person cashing. A:
present recollection of doing that (R.560).

Q:

I have no

Did you in fact

cash any of the traveler's cheques that you bought from American
Express? A: Which traveler's cheques are we talking about? I have
bought traveler's cheques on more than one occasion.

Q: T

h

e

traveler's cheques that we are speaking of, the $99,000.00 that you
purchased in May 1990, did you cash any of those?
present recollection of cashing those (R.559-560).

A: I have no
Q:

T h e r e

appears to be a signature on the bottom of each of these cheques
*** is that your signature?
place, in the bottom left?

Did you sign those cheques in that
A: I have no present recollection of

doing that (R.562) . Q: Are these cheques part of the cheques that
you told us that you bought in May of

1990; part

of that

$99,000.00? A: I can't answer that question. I have no records to
refer to.

You are rhyming off serial numbers 13 digits long, I

have no recollection of them (R.562).

The Prosecutor showed him

several cheques ending with different serial numbers and asked if
his signature was at the upper left. And, he answered, It appears
to be (R.563-567).

The Prosecutor asked again, Did you sign both

of these cheques on the bottom left?
recollection of signing them (R.568).
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A:

I have no present

The Prosecutor showed him

one more batch of traveler's cheques, serial number GZ030488110, in
the amount of $500.00 U.S., dated May 31, 1990, with a signature on
the upper left; Q: Is that your signature?

A: It appears to be.

Q: Is the May 31, 1990 in your hand writing? A: It does not appear
to be (R.569).
Pauze's thumbprints were found on 12 traveler's cheques by
Officer Technician Myers after August 7, 1991 (See Myers' Affidavit
at R.480).
The Supplemental Affidavit of Bruce Barr dated February 28,
1992 shows that he spoke with Detective Baxter and that Nicholls'
fingerprints were not on the cheques (R.483), and that Pauze's
fingerprints were found on the cheques (R.483), that Pauze was
identified "as being the person who cashed the stolen traveler's
cheques" *** (R.483-484). That Detective Baxter had arrested Pauze
and charged him with fraud, possession of property, uttering a
forged document (R.485). That banktellers identified Pauze as the
person who cashed the traveler's cheques (R.483).
See Ballarin Deposition at R.489:

It shows her as a

bankteller (R.490) and she cashed some of the cheques (R.491) and
he

countersigned

in front of me

(R.491).

[See her

entire

Deposition at R.1666-1701. Nicholls was present at her Deposition
(R.1669) and she had seen him in the hall at Court.
Nicholls the person that cashed the cheques?
See Olivieri Deposition at R.749-764:

Q: Was Mr.

A: No. (R.1695).]
She was a bankteller

(R.752), and cashed some of the cheques (R.752-754), and she saw
the customer counter-sign on the bottom line (R.754) and the
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customer showed her ID (R.754-758), and she was subpoenaed to
testify at the Pauze Preliminary (R.760-761), and she saw Nicholls
at the Courthouse (R.762). Q: Did Mr. Nicholls cash the cheques?
A: No, he didn't (R.764).
(R.1703).

[Nicholls was present at her deposition

Her entire deposition is at R.1703-1737.]

See Job Deposition at R. 765-779:

She worked for some banks

and now is a part-time employed teller and she picked out a picture
of a person

from the Police pictures that had

cashed

some

traveler's cheques with her. [See her entire Deposition at R.16271665.

Nicholls was present at her Deposition (R.1630).

Q: If the

person that you saw at your bank had cashed the cheques, if he were
to walk into this room, would you recognize him? A: Yes. Q: Is he
in the room now?

A: No (R.1649).]

See Griparic Deposition at R.794-805: She was an experienced
bankteller, bought and sold foreign currencies and traveler's
cheques, recognized the signatures on the cheques and recognized
her handwriting on the cheques and recalled that a gentlemen,
blonde, about 5'5" cashed the cheques.

She looked at Police

snapshots and pictures and told the Police, this is the gentlemen
that I remember seeing and I picked out the gentlemen that I felt
was the one that I had served that day. She was subpoenaed by the
Police to testify at the Pauze Preliminary.
cashed

the cheques was

The man that had

in the Courtroom, but his hair was

different, had the same facial features, same person, but the hair
did not match what I had seen before.

The same person had cashed

cheques at the airport. I was satisfied with the signature and the
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ID and I cashed the cheques and the signature was signed in front
of me.
(The entire Griparic Deposition is at R.1997-2021).
Nicholls at Court

She saw

(R.2017) at the Pauze Preliminary Inquiry.

Nicholls was at her deposition (R.1999). Q: To your knowledge, was
he the person who cashed the cheques?

A: No, he wasn't (R.2017).

See Assouline Deposition at R.806-848:

She was a bankteller

(R.809), saw ID and cashed some of the cheques (R.810), he signed
the bottom signature and she remembers the signature (R.811), and
she was questioned by the Police and Bruce Barr (R.815) and she saw
a Police picture book

(R.818) and pointed out the person to

Detective Baxter (R.819), and she went to Court to testify against
the individual who cashed the cheques (R.819-820), but did not see
the man in court who had cashed the cheques (R.821).

She had a

subpoena with the name Paul on it and she automatically assumed
that that was him (R.824).
you?

A.

Did Mr. Nicholls cash any cheques with

I don't think so, no (R.827).

Ten (10) people volunteered to defendant for the purpose of
defendant taking their Depositions in Toronto, Canada, to wit:
Job, Ballarin, Assouline, Office Myers, Pauze, Brad Nicholls, Debra
Jones, DeSousa, Griparic and Olivieri.

The 6 banktellers, Job,

Ballarin, Assouline, DeSousa, Griparic and Olivieri, stated that
Nicholls was not the person who cashed the cheques.
Defendant's Memorandum shows at R.426 that at the Hearing of
the First Motion for Summary Judgment, March 9, 1992, before Judge
Stirba, "For the first time it was disclosed publicly that Mr.
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Pauze's prints were found on both groups of cheques." (R.426).
Defendant and the Police had known about the Pauze thumbprints on
and after August 7, 1991 (R.361).
POINT II. SHOULD THE APPELLATE COURT AWARD AND ENTER
JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF IN THE AMOUNT OF $99,000.00 PLUS
LEGAL INTEREST THEREON FROM JUNE 9, 1990 TO DATE BECAUSE
OF THE BREACH OF CONTRACT BY DEFENDANT?
The Appellate Court should award and enter

judgment to

plaintiff for breach of contract in the amount of $99,000.00, plus
legal interest thereon, from June 9, 1990 to date. A remand is not
necessary if the evidence in the record is undisputed and the
Appellate Court can fairly and properly resolve the breach of
contract before it.

See Flying Diamond, supra.

Kindly see plaintiff's personal knowledge Affidavit (R. 41-57) :
Plaintiff complied with the terms and conditions of the Purchase
Agreement, Addendum

6 , (R.57).

He received no value from the

$99,000.00, did not sign the traveler's cheques in the lower left
corner, did not give the traveler's cheques to any person, did not
use the traveler's cheques in violation of law, did not transfer or
deliver the traveler's cheques to anyone, purchased the cheques to
use as cash, relied on the safety of the traveler's cheques of
$99,000.00 (R.47-49).
Defendant relied on plaintiff's credibility as the issue at
the Summary Judgment Motions.
Plaintiff's credibility and the weight of evidence cannot be
considered by the trial court at the Motions for Summary Judgment
for breach of contract.

See Singleton and other existing and

established Utah Case Law cited above.
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At the Motions for Summary Judgment, based

on breach of

contract, the trial court had no independent detached authority
(R.L. Warner, supra) to disregard, discard, disallow, put aside or
abandon the Utah line of existing and established Case Law cited
above, i.e. Singleton, Webster. See the Rulings in Addendums 3 and
4. discarding, putting aside and abandoning the Utah Case Law.
Defendant had and has no evidence that plaintiff cashed or
negotiated the cheques, see Manager Barr's Deposition (R.393-398),
Addendum 8.

See Barr's testimony (R.1218) that Nicholls did not

cash any of the cheques, that Nicholls did not countersign any
cheques, that Nicholls did not negotiate any cheques, Addendum 9.
The Canadian Police, including Detective Baxter's testimony,
had and has no evidence that plaintiff cashed the cheques; or
conspired with anyone (R.1551), Addendum 10.
The trial court should not be allowed

to enter

judgment

against plaintiff based on opinion where there is no evidence.
The Appellate Court should reverse the judgment awarded to
defendant and remand for determination the plaintiff's causes of
actions,

(1) mental

anguish

and distress,

(2) negligence

and

reckless indifference, (3) conversion, and (4) constructive fraud.
POINT III. ARE THE FINDINGS AN ABUSE OP DISCRETION/ A
MISTAKE, OR CLEARLY ERRONEOUS WHEN BASED ON SUSPICION,
SPECULATION, CONJECTURE, GUESSES, OR SURMISE?
Kindly see Addendum

5

from the Ruling of July 14, 1992

(R.1613-1625).
Findings are insufficient, a mistake and clearly erroneous
when

based

on

suspicion,

speculation,
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conjecture,

guesses

or

surmise.

Finding 3(j) provides "There is a very strong suspicion

of conspiracy between Mr. Nicholls and Mr. Pauze, and perhaps even
Mr. Len Jones and Mr. Brad Nicholls." Addendum

1 .

SUSPICION.
The act of suspecting, or the state of being
suspected; imagination, generally of something ill; distrust;
mistrust; doubt. McCalla v. State, 66 Ga.348. The apprehension of
something without proof or upon slight evidence. State v. Hall,
Mo.App., 285 S.W. 1009, 1011.
Suspicion implies a belief or
opinion based upon facts or circumstances which do not amount to
proof.
Burton v. McNeill, 196 S.C.250, 13 S.E.2d 10, 11, 133
A.L.R. 603. Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition.
SUSPECT. To have a slight or even vague idea concerning;
- not necessarily involving knowledge or belief or
likelihood. Cheek v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 131 P.
617, 624. Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition.
PERHAPS.
Means possibility but uncertainty; By some
chance, as may be the case. Webster Dictionary.
MAYBE.

Means perhaps. Webster Diet.

We will regard a finding as clearly erroneous only if the
finding is without adequate evidentiary support, or induced by an
erroneous view of the law.

Western Cap. & Sec, v. Knudsvict, 768

P.2d 991.
Despite the evidence, the findings are so lacking in support
as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. The trial court
discarded, disregarded and put aside hard core undisputed evidence
that the cheques were lost or stolen and that plaintiff received
nothing for his $99,000.00.

The findings must show that the

court's judgment follows logically from, and is supported by, the
evidence, Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 426.
••*** T O be a conspirator one must share a common purpose with
another, not merely suspect or have knowledge of the others own
private purpose ***." Harris v. Capitol Records, 413 P.2d at 145.
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Surmise or suspicion does not create affirmative evidence. Corpus
Christi,

supra.

A

judgment cannot be based

on guesses or

conjecture or speculation, see Oldenburg, supra and, "disbelief
does not create affirmative evidence to the contrary of that which
is discarded.11
The Conclusions and Judgment cannot be correct when the
Findings are based on suspicion, speculation, conjecture, guesses
or surmise.

We review the decision for correctness and afford no

special deference to the trial court's conclusions.

Whitehead v.

Whitehead. 193 UAR at 9.
The trial court disregarded, discarded, and put aside some
uncontradicted evidence, i.e.,
Plaintiff's Exhibits
Ex. 07 - Defendant's corporate credit card issued to Nicholls
August 1990.
Ex. 12 - Plaintiff's Statement of Income for 1988, 1989,
1990, and 1991
Ex. 13 - The June 5-6, 1990 Sweden sales information,
including terms of sale cash.
Ex. 14 - Plaintiff's trip to and return from Sweden, June 36, 1992.
Ex. 15 - Defendant issued 1 share of common stock to
plaintiff.
Ex. 16 -

Plaintiff's Canada passport with his picture.
NOTE: (Please see Defendant's Exhibit 17-d,
Police Photo Line-Up of 12 pictures.)
Ex. 17 - Plaintiff's home owners insurance policy, including
boat and equipment.
Ex. 18 - Plaintiff's insurance renewal of vehicle, May 1992.
Ex. 19 - Insurance policy on Nicholls.
Ex. 20 - Plaintiff's 1989, 1990 and 1991 tax returns.
Ex. 21 - Letter of credit to Plaintiff $1,420,000.00.
Ex. 22 - Letter of credit to Plaintiff $100/000.00.
Ex. 23 - Plaintiff's Certificate of Incorporation.
Ex. 24 - $92,000.00 loan to plaintiff.
Ex. 25 - Plaintiff was subpoenaed to testify at the Pauze
Preliminary Inquiry.
Ex. 26 - $100,000.00 life insurance policy issued to Nicholls
July 2, 1992.
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Ex. 31 Ex. 34 Ex. 35 -

List of credit cards to plaintiff from May 1990
through June 1992.
Over 7,000,000.00 yen (2 bills of exchange).
Plaintiff's list of credit cards from December 1991
through January 1994.

The Court erred in taxing all of the Defendant's Requested
Deposition and Witness Fee costs against plaintiff.
1.

The Court made no Findings (R.1033, Addendum

1 ) as to

the reasonableness and necessity of the taxable costs, to support
the Judgment, against Nicholls in the amount of $4,785.15 (R.1040).
Defendant requested deposition costs of $2,959.32 (R.936);
(R.928-942).
(R.943).

Plaintiff objected and moved to deny the costs

Defendant was awarded $4,785.15 in the Judgment as

deposition and witness fees costs, Addendum

2 .

Ten (10) people volunteered to defendant in Toronto, Canada
for defendant to take their depositions, see Costs at R.928-942.
It is unfair, unreasonable and unjust for the trial court to tax
these

deposition

costs

against

plaintiff

(R.929).

All

10

depositions show and establish that Nicholls did not countersign,
cash or negotiate any of the cheques.

Six (6) of the volunteers

were banktellers - who testified that Nicholls was not the person
who cashed any of the cheques.

Officer Myers volunteered to give

his deposition at the Toronto Police Headquarters and he testified,
the same as in his Affidavit, that twelve (12) thumbprints of
Pauze's were

found

on some of the cheques

(R.361).

volunteered and testified he handled some of the cheques.

Pauze
Brad

Nicholls, a brother of plaintiff, volunteered and testified that he
worked in the shop and knew little, if anything, about plaintiff's
30

business. Debra Jones, a friend of plaintiff, volunteered that she
did some bookkeeping for the business.
Toronto Police Detective Baxter volunteered (R.1532-1557A) to
defendant to attend the trial in Salt Lake City and give his
opinion at R.1551, Addendum

10 . See Costs of $500.00 for Baxter

at R.937 and hotel rooms at the Red Lion for $906.15 for Baxter and
Metropolitan Toronto City Attorney/Solicitor, Jane Eagan (R.939).
Taxed against plaintiff is the $500.00 and $453.08 with the other
costs (R.929-942). $953.08 given to Baxter by American Express for
his visit to Salt Lake City and his offered opinion Addendum

10 ,

at the trial on July 7-8, 1992 is contrary to and conflicts with
Sections 21-5-4 and 21-5-8.
The ten (10) depositions that were taken by defendant in
April-May 1992 in Toronto was after Pauze was discharged at the
Preliminary Inquiry February 3, 1992 (R.554), Addendum _ 7 _ , and
after Pauze had filed his $2,000,000.00 lawsuit in the Ontario
Court in March 1992, Pauze v. McCormack, Metropolitan Toronto.
Detective Peter Baxter, American Express, and Bruce Barr, (R.637649).

(Also see Def's Exhibit 12-d).

The City Attorney, Jane

Eagan, for Metropolitan Toronto came to Salt Lake City and sat
through the July 7-8, 1992 2-day trial in Judge Stirba's Court
(R.1208).
Nine (9) depositions were taken in the Law Offices of the
Attorneys for American Express (R.638), Osier, Hoskins & Harcourt,
67th Floor, First Canadian Place, Toronto Ontario Canada (R.16272024) .
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The Assouline, Myers, Debra Jones and DeSousa depositions were
not used at the trial (R.895).
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
Standard of Review: A trial court's grant or denial of
a motion for a new trial will not be overturned on appeal
absent an abuse of discretion,
(Cases cited).
The
general rule concerning abuse of discretion is that the
appellate court "will presume that the discretion of the
trial court was properly exercised unless the record
clearly shows to the contrary." (Cases cited). Matter
of Estate of Justheim, (CA 1991) 824 P.2d at 433; 175 UAR
38.
The Trial Court's error and abuse of discretion in denying
plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial denigrates substantial justice.
The Conclusions and Judgment are based on disbelief of plaintiff's
credibility

which

disbelief

perhaps, and maybe.

is based

See Addendum

1

on

suspicion,

suspect,

Finding 3(j); and

5 .

Surmise and suspicion is not evidence, Corpus Christi, supra.
Guesses

or conjectures will not support the Conclusions and

Judgment, Oldenburg, supra. Insufficient evidence does not support
the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment in this case.
The uncontradicted testimony of Lenoard Jones at trial is that
on May 30,1990 in the Nicholl's Office, while Nicholl's was in the
back shop, Paul Pauze flipped

through the travellers cheques in

the brief case on the desk (R1379-81) .
CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT
Appellant requests this Court to (1) reverse the judgment for
defendant (2) and to award and enter judgment for him in the amount
of $99,000.00 plus legal interest thereon from June 9, 1990 to date
because of the breach of contract by defendant and (3) to remand
32

for a hearing, determination

and an award,

if any, on the

plaintiff's causes of actions of (a) mental anguish and distress,
(b) negligence and reckless indifference, (c) conversion, and (d)
constructive fraud.
DATED this

day of December 1992.

Wa*&^./2~J?WALKER E. ANDERSON
/Q
I, Walker E. Anderson, certify that on the * Q day of
December 1992, I served four copies of the Brief Of The Appellant
upon Attorneys Keith E. Taylor, Kent 0. Roche, and Mark S. Webber,
counsel for Appellee, 201 South State Street, Suite 1800, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84147 and ten (10) copies with the Utah Supreme Court.

WALKER E. ANDERSON
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ADDENDUM 1
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

KEITH E. TAYLOR (3201)
KENT O. ROCHE (2783)
MARK S. WEBBER (4940)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendant
201 South State Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234

AUQ 2 8 1992
OtQrk 3r<

Court

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

RICHARD DOUGLAS (DOUG)
NICHOLLS,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)

AMERICAN EXPRESS TRAVEL
RELATED SERVICES COMPANY,
INC., a New York corporation,
Defendant.

)
)
)

Civil No. 900904706CN
Judge Anne M. Stirba

)
* * * * * * * *

This case was tried to the Court sitting without a jury
on July 7, 8, and 14, 1992.

Plaintiff Richard Douglas (Doug)

Nicholls ("Nicholls") was represented by Walker E. Anderson and
by Robert J. Fenn and Colin G. James of Dubernet, Stewart & Fenn.
Defendant American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc.
("American Express") was represented by Kent O. Roche and Mark S.
Webber of Parsons Behle & Latimer.
The Court, having now heard the evidence presented by
the parties at trial, having

judged

the credibility

of the
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witnesses, and being fully advised in the premises, hereby enters
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
American

Nicholls purchased a total of $99,000.00 (U.S.) in

Express

Travelers

Cheques.

He

purchased

$17,000.00

(U.S.) of Travelers Cheques on May 8, 1990 and purchased

the

remaining $82,000.00 (U.S.) of Travelers Cheques on May 30, 1990.
2.

On June

8,

1990, Nicholls reported

to

American

Express that the subject Travelers Cheques had been lost or stolen.

After American Express refused his demand that it issue

replacement cheques or refund his money, Nicholls commenced this
action, asserting claims for breach of contract, mental anguish
and distress, negligence and reckless indifference, conversion,
and constructive fraud.
3.
stolen.

The

subject Travelers Cheques were not

lost or

This finding is based upon all the evidence adduced at

trial, including, but not limited to, the following:
(a)

This

case

turns

on

the

credibility

of

Nicholls, and the Court finds that Nicholls' testimony was neither credible nor plausible;
(b)

In particular, it is not credible or believ-

able that, after purchasing the second batch of Travelers Cheques
at the American Express office in Toronto, Canada on May 30, 1990
and placing them into a briefcase already containing the first
batch of Travelers Cheques purchased on May 8, 1990, Nicholls
would

leave the briefcase unattended

until he arrived

in the trunk of his car

at the airport on June

3, 1990, would

then

10M-

hand-carry the briefcase onto an airplane and travel to Sweden
for the purpose of attending the equipment auction, would then
attend the auction and actually bid on several pieces of equipment (although never having the high bid on any piece of equipment) , and would then return home without at least once opening
the briefcase to verify that it still contained his Travelers
Cheques;
(c)
conversation

with

Nicholls testified that he had a telephone
Detective

Peter

Baxter

of

the

Metropolitan

Toronto Police Department on October 23, 1991 wherein, according
to Nicholls, Detective Baxter screamed at him, threatened him,
and demanded he sign the "will say" statement, when in fact, as
demonstrated by the tape recording of this conversation (Exhibit
19-D), Detective Baxter did none of these things;
(d)

A total of $87,000.00 of the subject Travel-

ers Cheques were cashed at 23 different locations in the Toronto
area during the period of May 31, 1990 through June 7, 1990;
(e)

The

fingerprints

of

Paul

Louis

Pauze

("Pauze") were found on 12 of the subject Travelers Cheques; the
12 cheques containing Pauze's fingerprints included cheques from
both the first batch purchased on May 8, 1990 and the second
batch purchased on May 30, 1990;
(f)

Pauze was also identified by four

bank tellers as the person who cashed certain of the

separate
subject

Travelers Cheques;
(g)
Toronto

Police

Pauze

Department

was
on

arrested
July

by

24, 1991

the
and

Metropolitan
charged

with

-3-
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unlawfully defr ai id I i lg N ich< ) 11 s by cashi ng a quantity of the subject Travelers Cheques and related c r i m e s ; Detective Baxter m a d e
the arrest after N i c h o l l s confirmed
edge,

to him that, to h i s k n o w l -

-ne saw or handled t h e si ibjuil

Travelers Cheques

from

the time N i c h o l l s left t h e American Express office on t h e afternoon

of M a y 10, 1 9 9 0 ; whei i. arrested,

Baxter

that

Nicholls1

In

had

office;

handled

Pauze

Pauze

informed

Detective

the Travelers

Cheques

wh i 1 e

asserted

to

Detective

Baxter

in

that

Nicho].

3

time thai, ^ second individual, i t 1 ii:

I .ei i J o n e s , w a s also s u p p o s -

edly present and could verify this p o i n t a s w e l l ;
(h)

I1"," ijer'sui'ini i frifinl

Pan/*-* IM", I cpii ii

business associate : i Nicholls
>*

(

: i .

years;
I Pauze7s crimi-

preliminary hearing

ria] pii : o c e e d :i i i :j,

•.)

lar } 3

nrl

II 95

-

:

testify in a m a n n e r consistent with h i m being

>

-

ous c r i m e ; h e refused t h e prosecutor's request that he review h i s
testimony

with

Ii

i

pi i

i

I

I In

h u m in<|,

. u n I <lui

IIIIIMI

I

IIIH

huai n i g

he could n o t even remember whether h e actually purchased t h e subject T r a v e l e r s Cheques

~w certain that h e d i d n o t countersign

t lie Travelers "C'heqi <
.., "~ of t h e foregoing and all the other

(j)
evidence adduced

a t t r i a l , there IF

a v&*\

conspiracy a im »i | 11 i r h i J J I r., I "a u ;

strong suspicion of

:

; e ' ei :t, I Ii : I »€ .i I 3 c nes

and M r . Brad N i c h o l l s .
4.
brougi -

T h e Court
,s

in

further

finds
• ;•

that
i an

this

action

attempt

to
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was
defraud

American Express.

Nevertheless, the Court does not find that

Nicholls' action was "without merit" within the meaning of Utah
and therefore denies American Express7

Code Ann. § 78-27-56

request for attorneys7 fees.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court has jurisdiction over this action and

the parties, and venue is also proper.
2.

American

Express

did

not

breach

the

purchase

agreements entered into at the time Nicholls purchased the subject Travelers Cheques, nor did American Express engage in any
tortious conduct against Nicholls.
3.

American Express is not entitled to recover its

attorneys7 fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.
4.

Judgment shall forthwith be entered in this action

in favor of American Express and against Nicholls.

The judgment

shall dismiss this action and each and every claim asserted by
Nicholls on the merits and

shall furthermore award American

Express its taxable costs as allowed by law.
EN^BRES==tfa±sr^^\ day otf"luoustt 1922.
BY THE COURSE*"'*1*0* -

ANNE M. STIRE
DISTRICT COURSE

^:_
z Jt~

^ - ^

iU\-

vmJ03T
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ADDENDUM 2
JUDGMENT

*"^«''vOur„.v.»,< |

MG 2 3 1992
$pk,**o

o», con

KEITH E. TAYLOR (3201)
KENT O. ROCHE (2783)
MARK S. WEBBER (4940)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendant
201 South State Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

RICHARD DOUGLAS (DOUG)
NICHOLLS,
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
AMERICAN EXPRESS TRAVEL
RELATED SERVICES COMPANY,
INC., a New York corporation,

Civil No. 900904706CN
Judge Anne M. Stirba

Defendant.
* * * * * * * *

This action came on for trial before the Court, Honorable Anne M. Stirba, District Court Judge, presiding, and the
issues having been duly tried, and the Court having entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that plaintiff Richard Douglas (Doug) Nicholls (,,Nicholls,/) take nothing, that this
action, including each and every claim asserted by Nicholls, be
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dismissed with prejudice on the merits, and that defendant American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. recover from
Nicholls its taxable costs in the amount oi

•^\S-

D^EEB-tkis c^lrv^day of August^- 1992.
BY THE COm'h.

ANNE^M^^yTRBA
DISTRicf;^OURT JUDGE

•2-
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ADDENDUM 3
MARCH 9, 1992 RULING BY THE TRIAL COURT

MONDAY, MARCH 9, 1992
J U D G E
THE COURT:

'S

R U L I N G

All right, thank you, Mr, Anderson.

As I have indicated, I read before the hearing today the
memoranda of both parties and the affidavit.
First of all, with regard to the Motion to
Strike, there really is no such thing as an oral motion
under our Rules of Civil Procedure, and I don't really
consider the Motion to Strike to be properly before this
Court.

It doesn't specifically —

and it is not

pinpointed to specific portions of the affidavit.
Did you want to say something, Mr. Anderson?
MR. ANDERSON:

Your Honor, Rule 7(b) provides

for motions at this hearing.
THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Anderson. But

nevertheless, there was no objection to that and I have
considered the Motion to Strike.

And in view of the

affidavits that are in the file and to which the Motions
to Strike are directed, it appears to me that the motion
is not well taken.

At least the supplemental affidavit of

Bruce Barr and the affidavit of Gordon Myers, as I read
them, contain statements based on personal knowledge.
I simply don f t see it the

And

same way Mr. Anderson does as

to statements that are contained in there.
Well, first of all, as a summary judgement,

1 1 C~

4
summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine
issues in dispute as to any material fact.

The burden is

on - - any empha s :i s nvi i s t be drawn in f avor o f the
non-moving party.
1 have lii'fiiil I In .n quineii t

Mt

Andeisnn llhir ninli

and with regard to the cases that he has brought to the
Court's attention, the Co"t 11 t cai 11 i• : t \ 7e • 2 gh 11: 1 e test:i ino 1 1 y
that is presented to it in the context of summary
judgment,

Can't weigh the credibili ty of one wi tness as

against another.

For instance, if the plaintiff says the

sky is blue and the defendant says the sky is green, the
Court can't make a determination whether the sky is blue
or green.

Nevertheless, the defendant or a non-moving

p a 1: t y <::: a 1: 1 p 1 :tt :: 1: ecii 1: • :i 1 i tj : f a w :i tness at issue, and that
is certainly what is at the heart of this particular case.
>

whether these checks were lost or stolen, and I believe
that

llli*-

(.it

t ulen J l !•

I Ii 11 11 r ' t

In f-11 ||) 1 t'bknitut.I

i|

t eat 1 a

genuine factual dispute that prevents the Court from
granting summary judgment.

I think that tl lis :i s ai 1 issue

,uuv uocd^ to go to trial rather than can be handled on
summary judgment.
Now, for that reason, I am going to deny the
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment but we are going
o set

>retrial schedule and a trial date at this

1 1R8

ADDENDUM 4
JUNE 23, 1992 RULING BY THE TRIAL COURT

1

TUESDAY, JUNE 23, 1992

2

J U D G E

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. ANDERSON:

5

THE COURT:

'S

R U L I N G

All right, thank you.

Mr, Anderson?

I will submit it, Your Honor.

All right.

Thank you, counsel.

As

6

I indicated, I am very familiar with the documents that

7

have been submitted

8

exhibits that were attached to these memoranda.

9

appears to me that credibility is a major issue in this

and the memoranda and also the
It

10

particular case and I think that therefore the cases that

11

say that credibility should not be weighed, really are not

12

applicable to this particular matter.

13

genuine issue of fact as to credibility in this case for

14

the reasons stated by Mr. Roche.

I think there is a

15

With regard to Mr. Anderson's concerns about the

16

admissibility of some of this testimony, there hasn't been

17

a Motion to Strike that testimony.

18

it.

19

trial based upon what is presented to the Court at that

20

time in argument.

21

I am not pre-judging

I think that that is a matter that is reserved for

I think that there is a particular point to the

22

testimony of Mr. Nicholls that no one else handled the

23

checks or knew about them, and then later a different

24

version comes out that "Well, Mr. Pauze was in his office

1 1 C^

has been no explanation of this discrepancy offered really
by Mr. Nicholls,
As I read the Webster case, a] thoi 1 gh the Coi 11 t
cautioned district courts to administer this rule with

a mis-statement.

There is no question of the witness not

understanding a question, nor is there any equivocal
answer that we have here.

It seems to me that there is a

blatant inconsistency on that issue alone.

So i.i those

10

reasons and other reasons stated by Mr. Roche, Mr.

11

Anderson, you have been served properly.

12

deny your Motion for Summary Judgment.

13

This is set for trial on July 7, 1992.
as well conduct soiru

15

another final pretrial
( I'.lnl

17

I am going ^o

We might

retrial matters now to save
'his matter.
n t . 1 IJ • i i 1 * ' '

M i l l 1J(.| )

*

19

21
22
23
24
25
1 1 en

ADDENDUM 5
JULY 14, 1992 RULING FOR JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT

1

defendant also contends that it is entitled to recover

2

its attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Section 78-27-

3

56 and the cases cited today as a result of plaintiff's

4

I

5

J

6
7

allegedly bad faith claims.
The Court finds that it has jurisdiction over
the parties, the subject matter of this lawsuit and all

I

claims, and that venue is also proper.

This case, in my

8

judgment, does turn on the credibility of Mr. Nicholls,

9

the plaintiff, and the following are the Court's Findings

10

of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

11

On May 8, 1990, the plaintiff purchased

12

$17,000, U.S. currency, in American Travelers Cheques,

13

from the bank of Nova Scotia in Woodbridge, Ontario,

14

Canada.

15

five of the Final Pretrial Order.

16

The cheques are identified as indicated on page

On May 30, the plaintiff purchased $82,000,

17

U.S. currency, in American Express Travelers Cheques from

18

I

the American Express Office in Toronto, Canada.

The

19

I

cheques are identified also on page five of the Final

20

J

Pretrial Order.

21

I

form that it typically uses was in fact used in this case

The American Express purchase agreement

22

and a copy of that is attached to the Final Pretrial

23

Order.

24
25

J

The plaintiff reported to the defendants on
June 8, 1990 and to the police on June 9, 1990 that the

38

TTTTTT

1
2

disregarded any —
I

absolutely disregarded e v i d e n c e o f any

c o n v i c t i o n s in 1971 or 1973.

T h i s is a c o n v i c t i o n o f

pleading guilty to p o s s e s s ! i ^f stolen fruo- t-H> *
I believe that this is only marginally relevant to this
5

particular case and I have n o t placed m u c h w e i g h t ori that
• % v :i c 11 o n.

par t i cu ]

this c a s e , the b u r d e n o f proof is o n the
8

plaintiff T

prove b y a preponderance o f the evidence the

a l l e g a t i o n s t:,l la t t:.l: le ;i;i •] a 1 i iti f f I la s ma :1 =s ,

I:i: i tl ii s • :::ase

10

the Court simply does not find t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s story

1'

credible o r p l a u s i b l e .

12

N i c h o l l s , :i t :i s i 10 b be] ievable that someone. -• ... -

13

$ 9 9 , 0 0 0 in t r a v e l e r s cheques in a briefcase in a trunk

11

tfhich

In a b u s i n e s s the size o f M r .
&ave

could b e opened without a k e y for days o n end and

15

mot e v e n check on them while o n a b u s i n e s s p u r c h a s i n g

16

trip overseas-

17

believable.

1

A l s o , the plaintiff's b u s i n e s s associate and

19
20

friend for t e n y e a r s , h a d fingerprints o n several cheques
I

and there was evidence that he cashed some
cheques.

22

I simply don't find that credible o r

I

f these

I believe that there is a very strong suspicion

of conspiracy between Mr. Nicholls arid Mr. Pauze, and

23

perhaps even Mr. Jones, and maybe even his brother

rind

24

chose are the others I believe the plaintiff is entitled

25

to look to in support of their theory.

^5

ADDENDUM 6
PURCHASE AGREEMENT

PURCHASE AGREEMENT
IMPORTANT. Read this Agreement carefully By AFTER LOSS:
either buying, signing, accepting or using these • You IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY Amexco of the loss
American Express Travellers Cheques, you agree to
or theft of the Travellers Cheque
everything written here
• You REPORT ali facts of the loss or theft to
REFUND: American Express Travel Related Services
Amexco and also to the police if Amexco asks you
Company Inc ( Amexco') will replace or refund the
to
amount shown on any lost or stolen Travellers Cheque • You INFORM Amexco of the serial number of the
only if you meet all of the requirements below
tost or stolen Travellers Cheque and the place and
BEFORE LOSS:
date of its purchase
• You HAVE SIGNED the Travellers Cheque in the • You COMPLETE Amexco's refund forms and
upper left corner In permanent ink
PROVIDE Amexco with acceptable proof of your
• You HAVE NOT SIGNED the Travellers Cheque in
identity
the lower left corner
• You GIVE Amexco all reasonable Information and
• You HAVE NOT GIVEN the Travellers Cheque to
help requested to make a complete Investigation
another person or company to hold or to keep,
of the loss or theft Amexco reserves the right
or as part of a confidence game
to investigate the loss or theft
• You HAVE NOT USED the Travellers Cheque in
violation of any law including as part of an illegal NO STOP PAYMENT: Amexco cannot stop
payment on any Travellers Cheque
bet game of chance or other prohibited action
• Your Travellers Cheque HAS NOT BEEN TAKEN
SIGN YOUR CHEQUES IMMEDIATELY
by court order or by government action
IN THE UPPER LEFT CORNER
REV * M

ADDENDUM 7
PAUZE CRIMINALLY DISCHARGED

ONTARIO COURT (PROVINCIAL DIVISION)
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
against
PAUL PAUZE
***************

P R E L I M I N A R Y

I N Q U I R Y

BEFORE HIS HONOUR, JUDGE E. S. LINDSAY
AT NORTH YORK, ONTARIO, ON FEBRUARY 3, 1992

CHARGES:

Fraud Over $1,000;
Possesionn Over $1,000;
Utter Forged Document x 8

APPEARANCES t
Counsel for the Crown
Counsel for the accused

****************

Ms. L. Lustman
Mr. L. Morris

2

PROVINCIAL COURT (CRIMINAL DIVISION)
T A B L E

OF

C O N T E N T S

Exam InChief

CrExam

NICHOLLS, Richard Douglas

10

32

—

GRIPARIC, Maria

36

41

_—

WITNESSES

ReExam

E X H I B I T S
EXHIBIT NUMBER

PUT IN ON PAGE

ONE

Six American Express travellers
cheques, numbered
GZO30382360-365.

19

TWO

Ten American Express travellers
cheques, with serial numbers
RA254101965-969, GZ030488087-089,
GZ030382382-383.

22

THREE

Six American Express travellers
cheques, serial numbers
GZ030488124-129, dated May 31,
1990.

24

FOUR

American Express travellers
cheques, serial numbers GZ030382376,
GZ030382331, GZ030382352 and
GZ030382287.

25

Six American Express travellers
cheques, serial numbers
GZ030488116-119, GZ030488130-131.

27

FIVE
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AG 87 (01/90)

MS, LUSTMAN: The only matter on our list,
Your Honour, is the matter of Paul Pauze,
which is numbers 4 to 13. I understand
counsel is here somewhere, but I haven't had
a chance to speak with him, and there is also
a witness that I would like a chance to speak
with, and I haven't had that chance.
THE COURT: Is he here, as far as you know?
MS. LUSTMAN: As far as I know, but I haven't
spoken to counsel yet.
THE COURT: It is a Prelim? How many
witnesses do you have in all?
MS. LUSTMAN: Right now, having not spoken to
couns el, e ight.
THE COURT: Eight witnesses. Has there been
full disclosure?
MS. LUSTMAN: As far as I know, yes.
THE COURT: All right. Then we will take our
morning recess.
R E C E S S
UPON RESUMING:
(REPORTER'S NOTE:

At this point, other unrelated matters
were dealt with.)

MS. LUSTMAN: Paul Pauze.
MR. MORRIS: If it please, Your Honour, my
name is Morris, initial L. I appear for Mr.
Pauze.
THE COURT: Yes, good morning, Mr. Morris.
MR. MORRIS: We are ready to proceed, Your

247

62

L U N C H

R E C E S S

UPON RESUMING:

10

15

20

251

30

a n o7 <m «(v>\

MS. LUSTMAN: Your Honour, I have had a
chance to use the lunch recess to go over
this case in great detail, and the evidence
that has already been heard, and at this
point I am not going to be calling anymore
evidence, and the Crown is not going to be
seeking a committal on any of these counts.
THE COURT: All right. You have no objection
to that, Counsel, I take it?
MR. MORRIS: No, I take it that my friend is
indicating that that will be the end of the
proceedings?
MS. LUSTMAN: Well, if it gets discharged,
that is the end of the proceedings.
MR. MORRIS: Thank you.
THE COURT: The accused then is discharged.
MR. MORRIS,: Thank you, Your Honour.
CLERK OF THE COURT: The other remaining two
charges?
MS. LUSTMAN: Oh, they are withdrawn.
THE COURT: The other two charges are
withdrawn.
MR. MORRIS: Thank you, Your Honour, and I
thank my friend.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Morris.
CLERK OF THE COURT: Can I get permission,
perhaps, to return the exhibits, or do you

On
?5??

63

want them kept as exhibits?
MS. LUSTMAN: No, the police would like those
back, actually.
THE COURT: Yes, so ordered, the exhibits
will be released.
MS. LUSTMAN: Yes, thank you very much.

*******************

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the
foregoing is a true and accurate
transcription of my recordings
to the best of my skill and ability.

Arlene K. Gorewicz
/
Official Court Reporter
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ADDENDUM 8
BARR DEPOSITION

McHUGH REPORTING - TORONTO, ONTARIO

A.B. Barr - 3
P R O C E E D I N G S
ALBERT BRUCE BARR,
called as a witness by and on behalf of the plaintiff,
being first duly sworn, was examined and testified as
follows:
EXAMINATION
MR. ANDERSON:

Let the record reflect

this deposition will be pursuant to the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Attorney

Bob Fenn and Attorney Walker Anderson are
present for the plaintiff and Attorney
Mark Webber is present with Mr. Bruce
Barr.
MR. WEBBER:

Let the record also

reflect that we've made Mr. Barr available
today voluntarily and without the need for
a subpoena.

BY MR. FENN:
Q.

Mr. Barr, I understand you're presently

employed with American Express Inc.?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

What position do you hold with that

company?
A.

I'm the Regional Security Manager.

394

McHUGH REPORTING - TORONTO, ONTARIO

A.B. Barr - 23
A.

Approximately the same time.

Q.

Same time?

A,

Approximately.

Q.

Or was it at the time you met Mr. Nicholls

in June of 1990 at your initial meeting?
A.

No.

Q.

You had no suspicions or belief at that

time?
MR. WEBBER:

That's not what you

asked him, that's a separate question.

BY MR. FENN:
Q.

So it was about the same time, spring of

A.

That's a ballpark guess on my part.

Q.

Okay.

'91?

What was the basis for your belief,

sir, evidentiary basis?
A.

I was informed by the Police Force that

Mr. Pauze had been identified as negotiating these
documents.
Q.

Other than that information did you have

any other evidence upon which you based your belief?
A.

No.

Q.

All right.

And would the same apply to

Mr. Nicholls?

3?5-

McHUGH REPORTING - TORONTO, ONTARIO

A.B.

Barr

-

24

A.

No.

Q.

And on what basis or evidence did you form

the belief that he was one of the culprits involved in
this?
A.

I have no evidence.

Q.

You have no evidence?

A.

That's purely submission or belief on my

Q.

Okay.

part.
You had no evidence in 1990 when he

came to your office in June, I take it, and you have
no evidence today?
A.

It's still my belief, but' I have no

evidence.
Q.

All right.

You are employed, if I can,

A.

Can you give me —

sir
just back up.

Can you

give me your understanding or belief of evidence?
Q.

Well, okay, before I lose my train of

thought if I can just deal a minute, sir
A.

I'd

like to clarify it before we leave it.

Q.

Evidence?

A.

Yes.

Q.

I'm asking what information or evidence or

documentation or what basis, you are a Police Officer
of 25 years?

3<?6

McHUGH REPORTING - TORONTO, ONTARIO

A.B. Barr - 33
A,

You objected.
MR. WEBBER:

I made my objection, you

go ahead and answer.
THE WITNESS:

Would you repeat the

question?

BY MR. FENN:
Q.

As a result of your investigation

I'm

suggesting to you, sir, that your investigation has
revealed that Mr. Nicholls did not in fact cash those
cheques personally?
**

MR. WEBBER:

Same objection.

THE WITNESS:

I have no evidence to

support that he personally negotiated the
items.

BY MR. FENN:
Q.

Okay.

I understand, sir, that in the

course of your investigation you learned that
Mr. Nicholls reported the matter to the police?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

Which Police Department did it get

reported to?
A.
Force.

I believe it was the York Regional Police
00^39*7

McHUGH REPORTING - TORONTO, ONTARIO

A.B. Barr - 117
Q.

Information and belief.

A.

That he signed those cheques on the

bottom?

Q.

Yes.

A.

No, I don't have.

Q.

Okay, I'll

take it one step further.

In

fact American Express doesn't have any evidence
whatsoever to show that of the negotiated cheques Mr.
Nicholls did in fact sign the bottom signature; is
that not correct?
**

MR. WEBBER:

I * gi going to make the

same objection because the witness
recently has questioned that.

BY MR. FENN:
Q.

Do you have any evidence, does American

Express have any evidence at all to show that Mr.
Nicholls cashed or signed the bottom left-hand corner
of the negotiated Travelers Cheques?
A.

No.

Q.

Okay.

I understand, sir, that you

attended at the arrest of Mr. Pauze?
A.

That is not correct.

Q.

You weren't at the police station?

A.

I was not at the police station.

,v
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ADDENDUM 9
BARR TESTIMONY

1
2

friend of his who negotiated the cheques, whose
I

fingerprints were found on the cheques.

3

Q

I am asking you the question.

4

A

I am answering the question, sir.

5

Q

At this time do you have any evidence that Mr.

6

Nicholls cashed any of the checks?

7

A

Cashed any of the cheques?

8

Q

Yes.

9

A

No, sir.

10

Q

At this time, do you have any evidence for

11

American Express that Mr. Nicholls counter-signed any

12

travelers cheque in the left-hand corner?

13

A

No, sir, I do note

14

Q

At this time do you have any evidence that Mr.

15
16
17

Nicholls personally negotiated any travelers cheque?
A

I believe there is one witness at the

deposition who identified Mr. Nicholls.

18

Q

I am asking you?

19

A

I overheard'the testimony.

20

Q

Do you have any personal knowledge of Mr.

21
22

Nicholls personally negotiating any travelers cheque?
A

23
24

I wasn't present when they were negotiated.
MR. ANDERSON:

moment.

Your Honor, indulge me just a

(Pause) Thank you, Your Honor.

25
25

T21S"

ADDENDUM 10
BAXTER TESTIMONY

1

A

Of course it disturbed me,

2

Q

Have you brought another case against Mr.

3

Pauze, a criminal case?

4

A

No, sir.

5

Q

You heard Mr. Nicholls testify at the

6

preliminary inquiry?

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

And you told this Court a few minutes ago that

9

in your opinion you told someone that either Paul Pauze

10

cashed the cheques, Doug Nicholls cashed the cheques, or

11

they conspired among themselves; that is your opinion,

12

isn't it?

13

A

That is my opinion, yes.

14

Q

Fine.

Then tell this Court, if you will, have

15

you brought any criminal charges for criminal conspiracy

16

against Paul Pauze and/or Doug Nicholls?

17

A

No, sir.

18

Q

Then I will ask you this question:

Have you

19

got any evidence to support your opinion, other than what

20

you have testified to here today, as to a criminal

21

conspiracy?

22

A

No evidence to put before a Court, sir, no.

23

Q

Did Doug Nicholls request documents from you?

24

A

Yes, he did.

Q

Did you give them to him?

25

J
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RULE 5 6 ,

ADDENDUM 1 1
SEC. 2 1 - 5 - 4 ;

21-5-8

Rule 56

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P 2d 1375 (Utah 1977).
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v.
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P 2d 703 (1965);

J.P.W Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486
(Utah 1979), Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah
1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reasonable Assurance of Actual Notice Required for
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Graham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
\ ! j ! - i s OJ.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218.
A.L.R. - Necessity of taking proof as to liabihty against defaulting defendant, 8 A L.R 3d
1070.
Appealability of order setting aside, or refusing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A L.R.3d
1272.
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and
hearing as to determination of amount of damages, 15 A.L R.3d 586.

Opening default or default judgment claimed
to have been obtained because of attorney's
mistake as to time or place of appearance,
trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d
^55
, * ? l u ? t o «jve notice of application for de[ a u l t J u d ^ e n t w ^ e o n 0 t l o c e o l s r e ( * u i r e d only
bv
custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383.
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303.
Default judgments against the United States
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 55 A L.R. Fed. 190.
Key Numbers. — Judgment *» 92 to 134.

Rule 56, Summary judgment,
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
168
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Rule 56

action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 56, F.R.C.P.

C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Contempt generally,
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Affidavit.
—Contents.
—Corporation.
—Experts.
—Inconsistency with deposition.
—Necessity of opposing affidavits.
Resting on pleadings.
—Objection.
—Sufficiency.
Hearsay and opinion testimony.
—Superseding pleadings.
—Unpleaded defenses.
—Verified pleading.
—Waiver of right to contest.
—When unavailable.
Exclusive control of facts.
—Who may make.
Affirmative defense.
Answers to interrogatories.

Appeal.

—Adversely affected party.
—Standard of review.
Attorney's fees.
Availability of motion.
Cross-motions.
Damages.
Discovery.
Disputed facts.
Evidence.
—Facts considered.
—Improper evidence.
—Proof.
—Weight of testimony.
Improper party plaintiff.
Issue of fact.
—Corporate existence.
—Deeds.
—Lease as security.
Judicial attitude.
Motion for new trial.

169

21-5-1
Section
21-5-14

FEES

996

J u d i c i a l C o u n c i l r u l e s governing jury
and w i t n e s s fee p a y m e n t .
The Judicial Council shall adopt rules governing
the method of payment of fees mileage, and other
expenses of jurors and witnesses, authorization for
payment, record of payment and the audit of payment records
1992

essarily traveled in going only regardless of
county lines
(c) Persons in the custody of a penal institution upon conviction of a criminal offense are not
entitled to a witness fee
(2) A witness attending from outside the state in a
civil case is allowed mileage at the rate of 25 cents
per mile and is taxed for the distance actually and
necessarily traveled inside the state in going only
(3> If the witness is attending from outside the
state in a criminal case, the state hhall reimburse the
witness under Section 77-21-3
(4 A prosecution witness or a witness subpoenaed
by an indigent defendant attending fiom outside the
county but within the state may receive reimbursement for necessary lodging and meal expenses under
rule of the Judicial Council
1992

21-5-1.5.

21-5-4.5.

21-5-14 5
21-5 15
21-5-16
21-5-17
21-5-18

When criminal defense witness may
be called at expense of state
Expenses for expert witnesses
Officials subpoenaed not entitled to
per diem — Exception
Only one fee per day allowed
Interpreters 1 fees taxed as costs
J u r y fee assessments — Payment

21-5-1.

S t a t e p a y m e n t for j u r o r s and s u b p o e n a e d p e r s o n s — A p p r o p r i a t i o n s and
costs — E x p e n s e s in j u s t i c e court.
(1) The state is responsible for payment of all fees
and expenses authorized by law for prosecution witnesses, witnesses subpoenaed by indigent defendants,
and interpreter costs in criminal actions in the courts
of record and actions in the juvenile court The state
is responsible for payment of all fees and expenses
authorized by law for jurors in the courts of record
For such payments, the Judicial Council shall receive
an annual appropriation contained in a separate line
item appropriation
(2) If expenses exceed the line item appropriation,
the administrator of the courts shall submit a claim
against the state to the Board of Examiners and request the board to recommend and submit a supplemental appropriation request to the Legislature for
the deficit incurred
(3) In the justice courts, the fees, mileage, and
other expenses authorized by law for jurors, prosecution witnesses, witnesses subpoenaed by indigent defendants and interpreter costs shall be paid by the
municipality if the action is prosecuted by the city
attorney, and by the county if the action is prosecuted
b> the county attorney
1992
21-5-2.

Witness and j u r o r s fees in c r i m i n a l c a s e s
— Daily r e p o r t of a t t e n d a n c e .
E v e n witness in a criminal case subpoenaed for
the state or for a defendant by order of the court at
the expense of the state, and eveiy juror, whether
grand or t u a l , shall unless temporarily excused, in
person report daily to the clerk his attendance at
court from the time of his appearance to the date of
his discharge, arid no per diem shall be allowed for
anv dav upon which attendance is not so reported
1953

21-5-3.

S t a t e m e n t of s e r v i c e of w i t n e s s o r juror
— Certificate.
Whenever a grand juror, or a witness for the state
before the grand jury, is finally discharged, the foreman of the grand jury shall furnish to the clerk of the
district court a statement containing information
necessarv for the clerk to make the juror's or
witness's certificate
1953
21-5-4. Fees a n d mileage.
(It Every juror and witness legally required or in
good faith requested to attend a trial court of lecord
or not of record or a grand jurv is entitled to
(a» $17 for each day in attendance, and
(b) if traveling more than 50 miles, $1 for each
four miles in exces* of 50 miles actually and nec-

F o o d a l l o w a n c e for j u r o r s — S e q u e s tration costs.
(1) Jurors may be provided with a reasonable food
allowance under the rules of the Judicial Council
(2) When a jury has been placed in sequestration
by order of the court, the necessar> expenses for food
and lodging shall be provided undei the rules of the
Judicial Council
1992
21-5-5 to 21-5-7.5. R e p e a l e d .

1992

21-5-8.

Witness fees in civil c a s e s — H o w p a i d —
Taxed as costs.
The fees and compensation of witnesses in all civil
causes shall be paid by the party who causes the witnesses to attend A witness is not obliged to attend
court in a civil cause when subpoenaed unless his fees
for one day's attendance are tendered or paid to him
on demand, or his fees for attendance for each day are
tendered or paid to him on demand The fees of witnesses paid in civil causes may be taxed as costs
against the losing party
1989
21-5-9, 21-5-10. R e p e a l e d .
21-5-11.

1992

J u s t i c e c o u r t j u d g e — Certificate of attendance — Records and reporting.
(1) Every justice court judge shall give to each person who has served before him as a juror or as a
witness in a criminal cause when summoned for the
prosecution by the county or city attorney or for the
defense by order of the court, a numbered certificate,
in which must be stated
(a) the name of the juror or witness,
(b) the title of the proceeding,
(c) the number of days in attendance,
(d) the number of miles traveled if the witness
has traveled more than 50 miles in going only,
and
(e) the amount due
(2) The certificate shall be presented to the county
or city attorney When certified by him as being correct, it shall be presented to the county or city auditor
and when allowed by the board of county commissioners or town council, the auditor shall draw his
warrant for it on the tieasurer
(3) Every justice court judge shall keep a record of
all certificates issued by him The record ^hall show
all of the facts stated in each certificate On the first
Monday of each month he shall file with the tieabuiei
a detailed statement of all ceitificates issued
i*w
21-5-12, 21-5-13.

Repealed.

